![]() |
Atlantic
Economic Journal |
4949 West Pine Blvd.
Second Floor
St. Louis, MO 63108-1431 USA Phone: (314) 454-0100 Fax: (314) 454-9109 |
| VOLUME 30 |
MARCH
2002
|
NUMBER 1
|
E-Mail: iaes@iaes.org
|
| Table of Contents | Submission | Manuscript Instructions | Anthology Instructions | Membership | Web Founders | Endowment Fund | IAES Officers | | |||
|
The Bourgeoisie (i.e., capitalism) cannot exist without
constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production. Conservation
of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary,
the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. The
bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years has created more
massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations
together. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids,
Roman aqueducts and Gothic cathedrals...[Marx and Engels, 1847].
|
|
This paper tests the structure performance hypothesis
by examining a highway construction industry in Florida. In the first-price
sealed bid auction literature, there is little evidence on how many bidders
are required for these markets to be competitive. Two different indicators
are used to capture the transition from collusion to competition---a discontinuous
effect of the number of bidders on winning bid price, and an associative
effect of repeat bidding of a contractor with the same set of firms. The
results suggest that winning bids decrease as the number of bidders rises
until there are about six to eight firms. Since subsequent entry has no
effect on the winning bid price, it is concluded that the highway construction
market becomes competitive with about eight bidders. (JEL: D43, D44, L13,
L74) Atlantic Econ. J., 30(1): pp. 13-25, March. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved
|
|
The coalition of North American labor unions and environmental
organizations that joined in Seattle in 1999 is examined in the context
of a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson simulation in which a labor abundant developing
country, with a comparative advantage in a globally polluting industry
but a weak environmental policy, endeavors to export some of the output
of that industry to a capital abundant industrialized country but is thwarted
by a trade sanction that requires it to adopt the strong environmental
policy of the industrialized country as a precondition for trade. Labor
unions in the industrialized country and environmental organizations both
gain when the developing country complies with the sanctions but lose
out when the World Trade Organization overrules the sanctions as barriers
to free trade. (JEL F11, Q25) Atlantic Econ. J., 30(1): pp. 26-33, March.
02. ŠAll Rights Reserved
|
|
Models of wage indexation uniformly have been based on
the simplifying assumption that nominal wages adjust upward or downward
symmetrically with unexpected price increases or decreases. Indexation
typically is asymmetric in actual contracts, however. Wages are indexed
to price increases but not to price reductions. This paper analyzes a
macroeconomic model with asymmetric indexation. On the one hand, this
paper finds that when stable equilibria supporting use of such asymmetrically
indexed contracts exist, the result is an unambiguous downward bias in
the base contract wage, because workers must pay a premium for insurance
against real wage reductions that unexpected inflation otherwise would
induce. On the other hand, the paper concludes that the likelihood of
existence of stable equilibria supporting positive wage indexation generally
declines as aggregate demand variability rises relative to the variability
of aggregate supply. This may help explain why relatively low levels of
wage indexation actually are observed in nations with relatively contained
aggregate demand volatility. (JEL E24) Atlantic Econ. J., 30(1): pp. 34-47,
March. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved
|
|
Human and Knowledge Capital: A Contribution to the Empirics of State Economic Growth RONALD L. MOOMAW, J. K. MULLEN, AND MARTIN WILLIAMS |
|
Considerable debate persists over the prospects for regional
economic convergence and the nature of economic growth in a sub-national
context. Although endogenous growth theories have been invoked to explain
persistent regional income gaps and related empirical phenomena, traditional
models have yet to be fully discredited. This paper utilizes a more complete
specification of a traditional growth model in an effort to better explain
variations in regional per capita income and growth levels. The authors'
effort involves a panel analysis of U.S. Gross State Product data that
enables controlling for variations in underlying production technologies.
They focus on the important role of both human and knowledge capital in
specifying regional dimensions of productivity and growth. The use of
alternative and unique definitions for knowledge capital inputs leads
to an improved empirical understanding of the regional growth process.
(JEL R) Atlantic Econ. J., 30(1): pp. 48-60, March. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved
|
| Back to contents |
|
Nominal Versus Real Wage Rigidity in a Monopoly Union: A Synthesis CHING-CHONG LAI AND JUIN-JEN CHANG |
|
Based upon a monopoly union model, this paper addresses how the degree of money illusion of the union member and the indexation rule of unemployment benefits are interdependent in governing the possibility of either nominal or real wage rigidity. Two main findings emerge from the analysis. First, nominal wage rigidity is present unless union members are characterized by complete money illusion and the government does not adjust its nominal unemployment payments. Second, real wage rigidity holds if union members are free of money illusion and nominal unemployment benefits are fully indexed to either union-set wages or the product price. (JEL J51) Atlantic Econ. J., 30(1): pp. 61-73, March. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved |
| Back to contents |
|
Searching for Cincinnatus: Representatives' Backgrounds and Voting Behavior REX PJESKY AND DANIEL SUTTER |
| Proponents of legislative term limits express concern about professional politicians, individuals who have no other occupation than running for and holding office. Term limits presumably will help allow the reemergence of the citizen-legislator. This paper examines whether pre-political background affects Congressional voting, specifically concentrating on whether a business background affects U.S. Chamber of Commerce vote scores. Business background significantly affects voting in the House, even with party affiliation and corporate and labor campaign contributions included as control variables, but background variables are insignificant for Senate voting. (JEL D72) Atlantic Econ. J., 30(1): pp. 74-86, March. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved |
| Back to contents |
An official publication of the International
Atlantic Economic Society