![]() |
Atlantic
Economic Journal |
4949 West Pine Blvd.
Second Floor
St. Louis, MO 63108-1431 USA Phone: (314) 454-0100 Fax: (314) 454-9109 |
| VOLUME 30 |
JUNE
2002
|
NUMBER 2
|
E-Mail: iaes@iaes.org
|
| Table of Contents | Submission | Manuscript Instructions | Anthology Instructions | Membership | Web Founders | Endowment Fund | IAES Officers | Front Page | |||
|
This paper examines the long-run relationship between
short-term and long-term interest rates (both nominal and real) in 19
countries, and explores the possibility that the relationship is statistically
stable using Lc, MeanF, and SupF statistics suggested by Hansen [1992].
Empirical results obtained from various cointegration techniques (Johansen,
Phillips and Hansen, Stock and Watson, and Park) and quarterly data (1973-1998)
show considerable support for the expectations hypothesis in all countries
(except the United Kingdom). In a majority of cases, it is also found
that a stable relationship exists between the short-term and long-term
interest rates. (JEL E43); Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 105-120, Jun.
02. ŠAll Rights Reserved
|
|
In the framework of its anti-dumping policy, the European
Union can use two instruments : an anti-dumping duty and a price-undertaking.
The objective of both instruments is to eliminate the price difference,
on the European market, between a European product and a similar foreign
product which is dumped on the European market. The authors first briefly
look at the institutional framework within which the European Union operates,
and at the actual use made of the two instruments since 1980. The main
purpose of the paper is to show that, from a welfare point of view, an
anti-dumping duty is always better than a price-undertaking. This result
is very robust: it holds for quasi-linear preferences, under both Bertrand
and Cournot competition, and irrespective of the timing of the firms'
decisions. (JEL D6, F13); Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 121-135, Jun.
02. ŠAll Rights Reserved
|
|
This paper elucidates the German electric power market,
especially the electricity transmission pricing system that has been in
force since January 2000. This paper points to several distorting pricing
features, as well as to grid access problems, and suggests that a regulation
office should be established. Moreover, it is argued that an independent
grid operator for the entire German grid would enhance its efficient operation,
and thereby increase the overall efficiency of the German electric power
market. In addition, the actual cost structure and calculation procedure
of a German grid operator is described in some detail. (JEL L94, Q4, D4);
Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 136-147, Jun. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved
|
|
The paper addresses the problem of defining and assessing
the scale of capital flight from Russia and of briefly reviewing the channels
through which capital, both of legal and illegal origin, illegally leaves
Russia. It then highlights the determinants of Russian capital flight,
as the traditional view of a reaction to divergences among real domestic
and foreign returns and to economic and political risks proves inadequate.
More important factors are linked to specific features of the transition
process under way, that is macroeconomic instability and variability of
government policies, weak protection of property rights and savings, a
fragile banking system limiting access to investment finance, high and
unevenly enforced taxes, a large share of unofficial activities, and considerable
levels of corruption. (JEL F32); Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 148-169,
Jun. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved
|
|
Although there has been a revival of interest in the trade-growth
nexus, the impact of trade liberalization on productivity gains remains
empirical, given the ambiguity in the literature on this issue. This paper
examines the case for Australia using annual data of eight two-digit manufacturing
industries from 1968-69 to 1994-95. Unlike earlier studies, total factor
productivity growth is first decomposed into technological progress and
gains in technical efficiency, and the effect of trade liberalization
is then investigated separately on TFP growth, as well as on each of the
components of TFP growth. The empirical finding that trade liberalization
has a positive and significant effect on technological progress, but no
significant effect on gains in technical efficiency, adds yet another
dimension to the evaluation of trade liberalization policies. (JEL F1,
L6, O3); Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 170-185, Jun. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved
|
| Back to contents |
|
On Access Pricing with Network Externalities DEMETRIUS YANNELIS |
|
It has been argued that access charges may be set optimally by applying the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR). The paper analyzes the optimality properties of the ECPR in the presence of network externalities in the telecommunications sector. It is assumed that network externalities in the fixed telephony, which is operated by an incumbent monopoly, may arise from the increase in the number of subscribers of a mobile carrier that seeks interconnection to the fixed network. It is shown that the optimality properties of the ECPR that may exist under some restrictive assumptions, do not hold in the presence of network externalities. Specifically, the ECPR may take into account the social opportunity cost with the entry of the competitor, but it fails to incorporate the social benefit accrued to consumers of the fixed telephony when network externalities are present. (JEL L51); Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 186-190, Jun. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved |
| Back to contents |
|
KEVIN D. FRICK |
| The objective is to determine whether single period data regarding willingness to pay for improvements in lifetime endowments when consumers cannot borrow can be used to measure the net present value of the improvements. When consumers who discount utility at the real interest rate can borrow and save, the willingness to pay for improvements in lifetime endowments is the net present value of the improvements. A single period measure of the willingness to pay for improvements in lifetime endowments without borrowing is at least as large as the improvement in the period in which the individual has the opportunity to obtain the stream of improvements. The sum of single period measures is an upper bound for the net present value of improvements in lifetime endowments. (JEL I1); Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 191-195, Jun. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved |
| Back to contents |
| With the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) relaxation of the definitions of cartels, price controls, and market manipulation in July 1998, the Court effectively banned the import of gray goods into the EU. This judgment, restricting parallel importation, raises arguments amongst trademark owners, gray marketers, and consumers. First of all, has the ECJ's judgment connived a situation of unfair competition? Secondly, can the import of gray market goods with genuine trademarks be considered a trademark infringement? Thirdly, is a gray marketer a free rider? To provide the answers to these questions, there is need to investigate the relationships of parallel importation, trademarks and market competition. In this study, the author uses a price dominant model to determine the positions of the trademark owner and the gray marketer. This study finds that parallel importation does not contravene trademark law. In the spirit of free competition, gray marketing activities can develop a situation of fair competition in which social welfare increases. Given the existence of heterogeneous preference of consumers, authorized distributors should offer better levels of service to gain market share. Therefore, the author strongly supports a parallel importation policy. (JEL M31, F33); Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 196-204, Jun. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved |
| Back to contents |
| Irving Fisher has been overlooked as an influence on William Vickrey's work on taxation and as a link between Edgeworth and Vickrey. Vickrey was Fisher's last and greatest student. (JEL B3, H); Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 205-208, Jun. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved |
| Back to contents |
| It has been shown by Cooper and Massell [1965] that making a non-preferential tariff reduction is always superior to joining a customs union. The purpose of this paper is to show that if the country concerned is a large country, then joining a customs union is not necessarily inferior to making a non-preferential tariff reduction. (JEL F13); Atlantic Econ. J., 30(2): pp. 209-212, Jun. 02. ŠAll Rights Reserved |
An official publication of the International
Atlantic Economic Society